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Nevertheless, one cannot exclude
underreporting of SAB by EARSS par-
ticipating hospitals since EARSS is a
voluntary reporting system. For exam-
ple, England reported 18,403 SAB
cases or an incidence of 37 SAB per
100,000 inhabitants from April 2002 to
March 2003 through its mandatory
surveillance scheme (5), whereas an
estimate for the United Kingdom from
the EARSS database would only give
7,800 SAB cases for 2003. However, it
is impossible to determine whether this
discrepancy was due to poor voluntary
reporting of SAB cases, a lower blood
culturing rate in EARSS participating
hospitals, or a poorly representative
sample of the country’s hospitals. Data
from the United Kingdom were
excluded from the present study on the
basis of the latter possibility; denomi-
nator information for <60% of the iso-
lates was available. 
In conclusion, EARSS is the first
comprehensive surveillance system
on antimicrobial resistance in Europe.
Within certain limitations, EARSS
can also provide valuable information
on blood-culturing practices and the
incidence of SAB in Europe. The sys-
tem is continuously being improved,
and additional information on the rep-
resentativeness of EARSS data is
being collected. This will allow us to
improve the quality and accuracy of
the reported incidence rates. In the
future, the system should allow
reporting of similar data for an even
larger number of European countries
and for additional microorganisms,
such as Escherichia coli.
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Family Clustering
of Avian Influenza A
(H5N1)
To the Editor: The unprecedented
epizootic of avian influenza A(H5N1)
in Asia poses a serious threat of caus-
ing the next global influenza pandem-
ic. H5N1 viruses, to which humans
have little or no immunity, have
demonstrated the capacity to infect
humans and cause severe illness and
death (1–4). Fortunately, these viruses
have not yet demonstrated the capaci-
ty for efficient and sustained person-
to-person transmission, although lim-
ited person-to-person transmission
was the cause of at least 1 family clus-
ter of cases (5). Since family clusters
of H5N1 illness may be the first sug-
gestion of a viral or epidemiologic
change, we have been monitoring
them with great interest.
Through our regional contacts and
public sources, we have monitored
family clusters and other aspects of
H5N1 in Southeast Asia. A cluster
was defined as >2 family members
with laboratory-confirmed H5N1 or
>2 family members with severe pneu-
monia or respiratory death, at least
one of which had confirmed H5N1.
To determine if family cluster events
had increased over time, we divided
the number of cluster events by the
total number of days in 2 discrete
periods and calculated rate ratios
(RR) and 95% confidence intervals
(CI). To determine whether the
increase in family clustering was
attributable to an increase in the num-
ber of cases, we divided the number
of family units with >2 laboratory-
confirmed cases by the total number
of family units in the period.
Percentage of deaths was also com-
pared.
From January 2004 to July 2005,
109 cases of avian influenza A
(H5N1) were officially reported to the
World Health Organization (WHO)
(6). During this time, 15 family clus-
ters were identified (Table). Of the 11
(73%) clusters that occurred in
Vietnam, 7 were in northern Vietnam.
Cluster size ranged from 2 to 5 per-
sons, and 9 (60%) had >2 persons
with laboratory-confirmed H5N1.
Cluster 6 in Thailand was well docu-
mented and was likely the result of
limited person-to-person transmission
(5). For the other clusters, epidemio-
logic information was insufficient to
determine whether person-to-person
transmission occurred. In at least
3 clusters in Vietnam (Table; clusters
5, 7, and 11), >7 days occurred
between the onset of the first and the
next case, suggesting that simultane-
ous acquisition from a common
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source was unlikely. In cluster 11, 2
nurses assisted in the care of the index
case-patient and subsequently were
hospitalized with severe pneumonia;
1 had laboratory-confirmed H5N1. 
Family clusters were slightly more
likely to have occurred between
December 2004 and July 2005 than in
the first year of the outbreak (9 clus-
ters in 243 days or 3.7 per 100 days
vs. 6 clusters in 365 days or 1.6 per
100 days, respectively; RR 2.3, 95%
CI 0.8–6.3). The difference was simi-
lar when the periods were limited to
the same 8 months, 1 year apart (RR
1.8, 95% CI 0.6–5.4). Twenty-five
(61%) of the 41 patients in the 15
family clusters died; the 7 persons
who recovered or were not ill experi-
enced secondary cases. 
Family clusters are still occurring;
however, they do not appear to be
increasing as a proportion of total
cases. The proportion of families that
were part of a cluster was similar from
December 2004 to July 2005 to the
proportion in the first year (6/55, 11%
vs. 3/41, 7%, respectively, p = 0.7).
However, the proportion of deaths
dropped significantly, from 32 of 44
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(73%) during December 2003 to
November 2004, to 23 of 65 (35%)
during December 2004 to July 2005
(p<0.0001). 
Although reports of H5N1 family
clusters slightly increased, the
increase was not statistically signifi-
cant. Nevertheless, we believe any
cluster of cases is of great concern and
should be promptly and thoroughly
investigated because it might be the
first indication of viral mutations
resulting in more efficient person-to-
person spread. Family clustering does
not necessarily indicate person-to-
person transmission, as it may also
result from common household expo-
sures to the same H5N1-infected
poultry or from other exposures, such
as to uncooked poultry products. 
The decrease in proportion of
deaths during 2005 is another epi-
demiologic change that should be
monitored closely because it may
reflect viral adaptation to the human
host. Surveillance for human cases of
avian influenza has been intensified in
recent months, perhaps resulting in
the identification of less severe cases.
Alternatively, more widespread labo-
ratory testing may be associated with
false-positive results. No evidence to
date shows genetic reassortment
between H5N1 and human influenza
A viruses (7). Viruses isolated from
case-patients need to be immediately
sequenced and characterized in rela-
tion to previously circulating viruses
to see whether they are evolving. 
Recent modeling studies suggest
that containing a pandemic at its source
may be possible because emergent
pandemic viruses may be less trans-
missible than commonly assumed (8),
and antiviral treatment and chemopro-
phylaxis may slow the spread (9).
Although the logistics of an attempt to
contain the beginning of a potential
influenza pandemic are formidable, we
believe it is not beyond the capability
of the modern global public health sys-
tem. As WHO (10) has called for,
countries should intensify their pan-
demic preparedness plans and
strengthen international collaborations.
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Imported
Tickborne
Relapsing Fever,
France
To the Editor: Tickborne relaps-
ing fevers caused by Borrelia species
are characterized by >1 recurrent
episodes of fever accompanied by
headache, myalgia, arthralgia, abdom-
inal pain, and eventually by hepatic or
neurologic manifestations. In the Old
World, Borrelia duttonii is endemic in
sub-Saharan East Africa (1) and B.
crocidurae and B. hispanica are dis-
tributed in West Africa and
Mediterranean countries (2). In North
America, B. hermsii, B. turicatae, and
B. parkeri cause mild and sporadic
fever cases, although several out-
breaks have been reported (3).
Relapsing fevers in disease-nonen-
demic countries are infrequently diag-
nosed and probably underdiagnosed
(4). We report 3 patients with relaps-
ing fever diagnosed in France in trav-
elers from disease-endemic countries.
Patient 1, a 29-year-old French
man, was admitted to Hôtel-Dieu in
Paris for a fourth recurrence of a
flulike syndrome. Three weeks earli-
er, he had traveled through Spain and
Morocco, when high-grade fever,
chills, myalgia, and arthralgia sudden-
ly developed. Symptoms quickly
resolved after treatment with salicylate
and acetaminophen, but 3 relapses
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